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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, A 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TEJA TRUJILLO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CASE NO. 92-0078-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Supp.) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the warrant authorizing the search of defendant's 
residence supported by probable cause? 
2. Did the magistrate properly authorize the execution of the 
search on a no-knock, nighttime basis? 
3. If the search warrant was defective in any of the above 
respects, is suppression of the evidence seized during the 
search required? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In considering an appeal of a motion to suppress denial, 
the Court of Appeals should give deference to the trial court's 
findings of fact, and be governed by a "clearly erroneous" 
standard. State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 881. Under federal law, a 
magistrate's probable cause determination is given great 
deference on review. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 
S.Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). The affidavit supporting a search 
warrant application must, however, provide a "substantial basis 
for determining the existence of probable cause." Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, quoted in United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 915, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984). The "substantial 
basis" requirement entails limited review of the magistrate's 
determination, asking only whether the affidavit contains 
sufficient factual information upon which a magistrate could have 
found probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 226, 103 S.Ct. at 
2326. The question of whether the state constitution requires 
less deferential review is a policy question, and hence one of 
law. 
A magistrate's authorization of a no-knock, nighttime 
search is held to be improper only if the warrant affidavit, read 
as whole, fails to support an inference that if the searching 
officers first announce their purpose, evidence may be lost, or 
physical harm may result to any person. See State v. Rowe, 806 
P.2d 730, 732-33 (Utah App.)(construing Utah Code Ann. ss77-23-
10(1990)), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). Thus 
deferential review of no-knock nighttime authorization is 
appropriate. 
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The question of whether a "good faith exception" to the 
exclusionary rule exists under the Utah Constitution, as it does 
under the United States Constitution, appears to be one of 
policy, and therefore law, reviewed without deference to a trial 
court's analysis. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah 
1991), and Rowe, 806 P.2d at 740 (Garff, J., concurring)(both 
deferring the issue). 
Questions of law which flow from these factual findings are 
to reviewed under a "correctness" standard. State v. Lopez, 181 
Utah Adv. Rep. 41, 42; State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution contain virtually 
identical text. The fourth amendment reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah's "no-knock" search warrant statute, Utah Code Ann. 
ss77-23-10 (1990), reads, in pertinent part: 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing 
entry into any building, room, conveyance, compartment or 
other enclosure, the officer executing the warrant may use 
such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if 
the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant 
that the officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, 
or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any person 
if notice were given. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence seized during a warrant-supported search of defendant's 
home. The facts and trial court proceedings are as follows: 
Statement of the Facts 
The critical facts are set forth in the search warrant 
affidavit. The affidavit was submitted by Paul Gardiner of the 
Salt Lake County Metro Narcotics Strike Force, an experienced 
narcotics investigator, and had been reviewed by a county 
attorney (see affidavit attached to appellants brief as addendum 
"C", at 4). Detective Gardiner sought a warrant to search the 
home of the defendant Teja Trujillo, for cocaine, paraphernalia, 
packaging materials, currency, narcotics records, and residency 
papers (affidavit attachment "a"). 
The most significant item in the affidavit, as identified 
by the trial court, is the recitation by Gardiner, of the events 
surrounding the cocaine purchase which took place at the address 
in question, within 72 hours prior to the issuance of the warrant 
(affidavit at 3). That purchase was a "controlled buy11, made 
through one of the confidential informants. The informant was 
subjected to a pre- and post-purchase search, and kept under 
surveillance as he entered and left the home (ijd.). The 
informant reported that the defendant had been present during the 
purchase of cocaine at the home. 
Additionally, there were two other confidential informants 
who gave information to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force on prior 
occasions with regards to the defendant and the other two 
individuals named in the warrant (affidavit at 3)• 
Based on the information available to Detective Gardiner, 
and his experience in narcotics investigation, a warrant to 
search the persons of defendant and two other individuals who 
were present during the "controlled buy" was requested, together 
with authorization to search the premises. The warrant was 
sought as a no-knock, nighttime warrant based on Detective 
Gardiner's statement that in his experience, drug traffickers 
frequently possess firearms, cocaine is easily and quickly 
disposed of, and that at this particular address, the residents 
did not open their door without asking who it was first. 
The warrant and no-knock, nighttime authority were issued 
as requested. The entry and search were carried out, and small 
amounts of marijuana were located on the premises. 
Trial Court Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
11.24.020 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. She moved 
to suppress the seized evidence. 
The motion to suppress asserted only that the "warrant was 
invalid", and referenced the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. There was no memorandum in support offered, 
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but at the hearing, defendant indicated that the basis for the 
motion to suppress was three fold (see transcript at 1), 
The first argument raised by the defendant was with respect 
to the reliability of informants, and the standard of scrutiny 
employed by the magistrate. The second issue was with the 
truthfulness of the affidavit, and the final issue was with the 
issuance of the warrant as a no-knock, nighttime authorization. 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. It first 
found that there was ample probable cause to indicate that the 
warrant should be authorized. The court stated that the 
controlled buy, together with the information from the other 
confidential informants was sufficient to justify the warrant 
being issued, clearly basing this decision on the truthfulness of 
Detective Gardiner's details of the controlled buy (transcript at 
55) • 
The court next addressed the no-knock authorization, and 
found that all though there were numerous items to be seized if 
found, clearly the primary purpose for the warrant was to search 
for cocaine, and the nature of cocaine, being easy to dispose of, 
allows for the no-knock warrant authority. 
Finally, the court found that the fact that they did not 
find what they were looking for, "does not in any way, indicate 
that the affidavit is not sufficient on its face11 (transcript at 
56) . 
The motion to suppress having been denied, the defendant 
pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance, 
as charged, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her 
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motion. She was sentenced on October 3rd, 1991 to serve 3 0 days 
beginning October 4th, 1991. This appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court, having heard the evidence, ruled properly 
in finding that Judge Robin W. Reese acted properly in 
authorizing a no-knock, nighttime search warrant. 
The "no-knockfl, nighttime authorization was proper. The 
standard of proof for such authorization should be lower than 
that required to issue the underlying warrant. This is so 
because once a warrant has been issued, concern shifts to a 
determination of how the search can most effectively and safely 
be conducted. Here, cocaine, an easily hidden, easily destroyed 
or discarded substance was sought; it might be lost if the search 
were announced. More importantly, the fact that drug dealers are 
frequently armed, plus specific information about the location of 
the cocaine in the defendant's home, supported a no-knock 
authorization. 
Because there is little question that the underlying 
warrant is valid, the City's "good faith exception to 
suppression" argument is limited to the closer questions of no-
knock and nighttime authorization. If that authorization is 
found to be defective, suppression of the seized evidence is 
inappropriate. It is not clear that evidence should ever be 
suppressed where the only search defect is an improper no-knock, 
nighttime entry. Further, reasonable officer reliance on a 
warrant that is later held defective should weigh against 
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suppression, under both federal and state law principles. 
Application of this rule is especially justified here, because 
the no-knock authority granted in this warrant was completely 
consistent with the most recent case holding on the issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MAGISTRATE'S PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION 
AND ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD BE 
REAFFIRMED ON APPEAL 
The City treats Points I and II of the defendant's brief on 
appeal as a challenge to the magistrate's probable cause 
determination and issuance of the underlying search warrant. 
Defendant argues that stricter probable cause review should be 
undertaken under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
than traditionally occurs under the fourth amendment. Her 
argument should be rejected. 
A. The Search Warrant Affidavit Established 
Probable Cause that Criminal Evidence Would 
be Found in Defendant's Home 
The trial court did rule that the underlying warrant was 
validly issued, holding that probable cause existed based on the 
personal observations of Detective Gardiner, as buttressed by the 
three informants. In reviewing the probable cause ruling and the 
issuance of the underlying warrant, defendant's challenge fails 
on its merits. 
1. Reasons for Deferential Appellate Review 
The trial court's "sufficient basis" ruling comported with 
the fourth amendment rule that a magistrate's probable cause 
determination is deferentially reviewed, and reversed only if it 
is clearly erroneous; that is, only if it had no "substantial 
basis." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990-91 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516-517 (Utah App. 1992). Accord 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914-15, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416 
(1984). Defendant, however, urges a departure from this rule 
under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, asking for 
non-deferential, de novo review of the magistrate's probable 
cause determination. Derived from concurring comments in State 
v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1991), defendant's argument 
should be rejected. 
Concurring in Weaver, Judge Orme asked why a search warrant 
affidavit should not be reviewed on appeal as "a question of law, 
with no particular deference accorded." 817 P.2d at 836. One 
answer is that magistrates, no less than their colleagues on 
appellate benches, are sworn to uphold the federal and state 
constitutions. U.S. Const. Art VI, cl. 3; Utah Const. Art. IV, 
section 10. Absent the clearest showing that this sworn duty has 
been abdicated, a magistrate's probable cause ruling should be 
respected as a conscientiously considered decision, made in full 
awareness of the involved constitutional principles. 
Judge Orme also criticized deferential review of warrants 
and warrant affidavits as a means of encouraging police officers 
to seek warrants, a rationale advanced by the federal Supreme 
Court. 817 P.2d at 83 5. But if warrant affidavits are 
nondeferentially reviewed on appeal, magistrates may feel less 
incentive to scrutinize them carefully. Better to simply issue 
the warrant without fuss, and let the appellate court, with the 
"luxury of group decision-making, more time, and research 
assistance," M., decide later whether the affidavit was 
sufficient. Thus nondeferential review of warrants may actually 
weaken the interpretation of the judicial branch between citizens 
and police before a search occurs, interposition that is the 
"bulwark" of search and seizure protection. Franks v. Delaware, 
438 U.S. 154, 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2681 (1978). 
Additionally, because it occurs before a search, a 
magistrate's probable cause determination is arguably more 
objective than one made after-the-fact. Before issuing a search 
warrant, the magistrate must find "a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place." Illinois v. Gate, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
2332 (1983) (emphasis added). Hindsight based review of 
warrants, however, may be colored by matters extraneous to this 
pre-search probable cause determination. 
Further, unlike "other writings," such as contracts, a 
warrant affidavit merely asks permission to conduct a search. It 
is the magistrate who, upon an assessment that probable cause 
exists, issues the "contract," of warrant, ordering officers to 
search the identified place. See Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-1 
(1990)("a search warrant is an order . . . directed to a peace 
officer . . . " ) . Thus, principles of contract interpretation, 
cf. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 836 (Orme, J., concurring), are 
inapplicable to warrant affidavits. 
It is also appropriate to defer to a probable cause ruling 
that has been affirmed by the trial court after the search, as 
occurred here. In such instances, the defendant has had a full 
opportunity to attack the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit. 
When such attacks fail, the appellate court faces a situation 
wherein two judicial officers have already approved the 
challenged search. Therefore, particularly in a close case, 
deference is appropriate, £f. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 835 (Orme, J., 
concuring). Indeed, reversal upon a two-to-one split appellate 
decision would actually reflect a three-to-two determination of 
all judges that the warrant was valid. Thus nondeferential 
appellate warrant review could actually foster inconsistent, 
unpredictable results. Cf. State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299-
1300 (Utah App. 1991) . 
Finally, deferential review of search warrants, and of 
trial court rulings upholding those warrants, is appropriate in 
light of the cost of suppressing evidence: most typically, a 
societal cost is paid, in that guilty defendants go free. That 
cost should be due only upon the clearest showing that the 
challenged evidence was obtained in violation of constitutional 
rights, especially when front-line magistrates and trial courts 
have already ruled to the contrary. 
In the end, defendant's argument for de novo appellate 
review of warrant-supported searches amounts to an assertion that 
such searches should be invalidated if an appellate court 
majority decides that it would not have issued the warrant in the 
first instance. This is wrong. Until and unless appellate 
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courts themselves assume the burden of issuing warrants, the 
efforts of the traditional front-line judicial decision makers 
should be subject to reversal only for clear error. 
2. Marshalling the Evidence 
Concomitant with express adoption of a "clearly erroneous" 
based standard of review for warrant-supported searches under the 
state constitution, this Court should apply an evidence-
marshalling requirement to such review. This requirement is 
already in place for challenges to criminal guilt findings. See 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-739 (Utah App. 1990). 
Marshalling essentially requires an appellant to confront the 
strongest adverse evidence head-on, and to demonstrate why that 
evidence does not support the challenged judgement. Id. at 738. 
This "aids the appellate courts in deliberations and in the 
opinion-writing process." Id. at 739. 
This case illustrates why the marshalling standard should 
also apply to appeals from motions to suppress evidence. 
Defendant's appellate brief attempts to evade the impact the 
controlled cocaine buy in her home had to have on the 
magistrate's decision to issue the warrant. Defendant's attempt 
to confuse the issue of whether the buy actually took place at 
the named residence, is a blatant misrepresentation of the facts 
that she herself dealt extensively with. The cross examination 
dealt exhaustively with the buy at the named residence from 
approximately 3/4 of the way down on page 11 of the transcript, 
to half way down page 16, leaving no doubt that the affidavit was 
clear on its face, and was not controverted by Detective 
Gardiner's testimony at the hearing. 
Even a single controlled drug buy, within a week of the 
warrant affidavit, is sufficient to establish probable cause. 
See State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah App. 1988). The 
controlled buy in this case occurred within 72 hours preceding 
this affidavit (affidavit at 3). The City is aware of no case 
where a warrant based upon recent controlled buys has been held 
invalid. Even where such purchases are less-than-ideally 
controlled, because an "unwitting" intermediary is the conduit 
between the confidential informant and the suspected drug dealer, 
probable cause determinations and the issuance of warrants have 
been upheld on appeal. See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516 
(Utah App. 1992), and cases cited therein. 
Viewed in this light, defendant's skirting of the 
controlled buy issue, and the statements which placed the 
defendant present at the controlled buy in her own home 
represents, at best, unhelpful appellate briefing. It suggests 
an attempt to confuse the real issues, by deliberately 
misconstruing testimony which defendant herself belabored. To 
forestall such problems in the future, once a search warrant has 
been issued, or a motion to suppress has be decided in the trial 
court, an evidence-marshalling standard should apply to efforts 
to reverse those decisions on appeal. 
3. "Totality of the Circumstances11 the Test. 
Defendant asks this Court to adopt a strict "informant 
reliability" approach to probable cause and search warrant 
issuance under the Utah Constitution. This approach is dubbed 
the "two-pronged" "Aguilar-Spinelli" test, after Aguilar v. 
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Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509 (1964), and Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969). In essence, the 
approach requires that when a search warrant request is supported 
by informants' statements, the informants' "basis of knowledge" 
and "veracity" must be established for the magistrate. See 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 228 nn. 3-4, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
2327 nn. 3-4 (1983). 
In Gates, the United States Supreme Court rejected a strict 
"informant reliability" approach, adopting instead a common 
sense-based, "totality of the circumstances" approach under the 
fourth amendment. 4 62 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. at 23 32. This 
approach has been embraced by Utah's appellate courts. See State 
v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (Utah 1985); State v. Purser, 
828 P.2d at 516 (Utah App. 1992). Informant reliability does 
remain a factor in the "totality" analysis. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
at 1101; Purser, 828 P.2d at 516; accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 
103 S.Ct. at 2328. However, where informant reliability is 
unsure, independent police investigation can compensate, 
establishing probable cause. See State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 
(Utah 1984)(police investigation corroborated informant's tip). 
Defendant argues that under Article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, informant reliability should be a sine qua non 
for probable cause and search warrant issuance. However, Utah 
courts have expressed no dissatisfaction or difficulty with the 
"totality" approach. Compare State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
466, 469 (Utah 1990)(plurality opinion)(finding federal 
automobile search law "intolerably confusing," and attempting to 
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"simplify11 it under the state constitution) . Indeed, this Court 
has applied the test to search warrants under Article I, section 
14. See State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah App. 1987). 
Accordingly, there is no compelling reason to depart from the 
Gates totality of the circumstances test. 
Defendant cites a number of cases that reject the totality 
of the circumstances approach, retaining an Aguilar-Spinelli 
informant reliability requirement under state constitutions. 
Often, however, that requirement has been retained in name only, 
with the courts holding that informant reliability problems can 
be overcome, and probable cause established, through independent 
police investigation. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 
557 (Mass. 1985); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 144 (Wash. 
1984); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 437 (Tenn. 1989). Thus 
these decisions actually represent a totality of the 
circumstances approach. 
Other cases deal with warrants issued solely upon informant 
statements, with no independent investigation. E.g., People v. 
Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 410 (1988) (but failing 
to address fruits of earlier consent search as basis for probable 
cause); State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Alaska 1985); 
People v. Serbine, 421 Mich. 502, 364 N.W.2d 658 (1985). These 
cases properly demonstrate that where informant statements are 
the only basis for probable cause, the informants had better be 
reliable; this requirement is retained under the totality of the 
circumstances test. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1205 ("even under 
[the Gates] standard, compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli 
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guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient basis for 
probable cause"). 
In no case cited by the defendant has a warrant been 
invalidated where it was supported, as happened here, by clear 
independent evidence of obviously illegal conduct. Therefore, 
defendant's argument for a strict "informant reliability" 
approach to warrant affidavits is unpersuasive, and should be 
rejected. 
4, Failure of "Utah History11 Argument. 
Finally, a short comment on defendant's historical analysis 
of why the Utah Constitution should provide broader search and 
seizure protection that the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Relating heavy-handed searches by federal officers 
against pre-statehood Mormon polygamists, defendant asserts that 
the framers of Utah's constitution intended "more stringent 
requirements" for searches under the state constitution than 
existed under the fourth amendment. 
This proposition is highly unlikely, when one considers 
that the drafters, rather than drafting a significantly different 
search and seizure provision, adopted the fourth amendment 
practically verbatim. Utah's provision, Article I section 14, 
was apparently approved by the Utah Constitutional Convention 
without debate. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure 
Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, 
17 Utah J. Contemp. L. 267, 275 (1991). Further, Article III of 
the Utah Constitution prohibits religious persectuion and outlaws 
religious protection and eliminates the root cause of the search 
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and seizure abuses that its framers had experienced. This 
strongly suggests that the framers did not intend stronger 
general protection against searches and seizures than the fourth 
amendment provided; they provided additional protection for 
religious practices only. This case does not involve a search 
related to religion, and is thus not entitled to the stronger 
protections set forth under Article III. 
In sum, defendant's request for de novo appellate review of 
search warrants and the supporting affidavits should be rejected 
in favor of deference to the front-line magistrates and trial 
courts; further, an evidence-marshalling standard should apply to 
such review. Her request for application of a strict "informant 
reliability" approach to search warrants under the Utah 
Constitution is patently unsound. Accordingly, the magistrate's 
probable cause determination and issuance of the underlying 
search warrant in this case, already affirmed by the trial court, 
should now be reaffirmed. 
II. THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY AUTHORIZED THE "NO-KNOCK" 
EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH. 
Defendant next contends that the magistrate erred in 
authorizing the search to be conducted as an "no-knock", 
nighttime search. Under the correct standards of review and 
proof for no-knock, nighttime authorization, this argument should 
be rejected. 
A. No-Knock Warrant Authorization Should be 
Deferentially Reviewed for Reasonableness, 
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By its terms, Utah's no-knock statute comes into play only 
11
 [w]hen a search warrant has been issued . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
section 77-23-10 (1990). Its focus is not probable cause, but 
only the question of how the search will be conducted. See State 
v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 703 (Utah 1988)(no-knock challenge did not 
assail underlying search, but only "the manner of entry"). For 
no-knock search, the statute requires "proof" that if the search 
is announced, evidence "may" be lost, or that personal physical 
harm "may" result. Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-10(2). 
Defendant emphasizes the statutory "proof" requirement, 
however, the "may" language should be emphasized, and construed 
to require a standard of proof for no-knock authority that is 
less than the probable cause standard for issuance of the 
underlying warrant. So long as some case-specific evidence 
supports the issuance of a no-knock, nighttime warrant, a 
magistrate's authorization should be deferentially reviewed, and 
reversed only if it is clearly unreasonable. There are several 
good reasons for such an approach. 
First, by definition, a search warrant defeats the privacy 
expectation of the subjects of the search. There is no question 
of consent; the search is going to occur even over resistance. 
In their expertise, the searching officers can anticipate the 
likelihood and form of such resistance, whether efforts to 
conceal the sought after contraband are likely, physical 
resistance to officer entry or any combination of these things. 
In carrying out the warrant's command to enter a particular place 
and seize particular things, Utah Code Ann. section 77-23-1 
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(1990), officer expertise about how best to follow that command 
should be respected. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 
257, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1693 (1978)(question of how to conduct 
warrant-authorized search "is generally left to the discretion of 
the executing officers," subject to reasonableness requirement). 
The language of the Utah no-knock statute properly allows the 
magistrate to respect that expertise; reviewing courts, in turn, 
should defer to the magistrate's no-knock, nighttime 
authorization. 
Second, where probable cause exists, it is reasonable to 
believe that the criminal suspects wish to thwart any search. 
The element of surprise may be needed to overcome the suspects' 
efforts toward that end. A request for a no-knock, nighttime 
search authority, providing that element, should not be 
overscrutinized, especially where the nature of the criminal 
activity—such as cocaine dealing—facilitates easy destruction 
or secreting of the contraband. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 
732-33 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)(small 
amounts of drugs suspected). See also, State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 
1363, 1365-67 (Utah App. 1987), and State v. Valento, 405 N.W.2d 
914, 920 (Minn. App. 1987)(showing of large-scale operations 
supported no-knock authorization). 
Finally, a no-knock, nighttime search will often be 
advisable for physical safety reasons. In general, "American 
criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year 
in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the 
line of duty, and thousands more wounded." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
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U.S. 1, 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881 (1968). More specifically, Utah 
courts have noted that drug dealers are often armed. State v. 
Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986)(Zimmerman, J., 
concurring); Accord People v. Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201, 1204-05 
(Colo. 1989). Further, in Utah, possession of firearms for 
"defense of . • . property" is constitutionally endorsed. Utah 
Const. Art. I, section 6. The likelihood of violence upon an 
unconsented home entry, especially where criminal activity is 
already suspected, is therefore very real. 
Accordingly, when law enforcement officers have obtained a 
warrant, and thereby assumed a duty to search a given place, 
their request to enter the place on a no-knock, nighttime basis 
should be granted if it is reasonable. No-knock, nighttime 
authority should be refused, or reversed on review, only if no 
evidence particular to the case at hand, gleaned from the warrant 
affidavit as a whole, supports it. See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 732-33. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Upheld the 
Magistrate's No-Knock Search Authorization, 
Under the foregoing standard, the magistrate's no-knock, 
nighttime authorization should be reaffirmed on appeal. The 
trial court noted that ready loss or destruction of the cocaine 
in defendant's home was a possibility (transcript at 56). 
No-knock authority was also supported as a matter of 
safety. Consistent with the concurrence in Dorsey, cited above, 
and with the confirmed criminal history of the defendant, in 
combination with the suspected cocaine dealing, it was reasonable 
to issue the no-knock, nighttime warrant for safety reasons. 
With reasonableness as the standard, this ruling was correct. 
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This case clearly shows the safety risk as did State v. Purser, 
828 P.2d 516 (Utah App. 1992). Defendant here had prior criminal 
history, as did defendant Purser. 
In State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), the Court 
affirmed the reasonableness of precautions when officers "enter 
hostile environs." _Id. at 293-94 (citing Terry), and a home that 
is to be entered pursuant to a probable cause finding is 
presumptively "hostile." 
Further, affiant Gardiner's statement that "drug 
traffickers frequently possess firearms" (affidavit at 6) was not 
challenged in defendant's motion to suppress. Gardiner 
specifically states that he "has been on numerous narcotics 
search warrants where the suspects have firearms readily 
available." 
Defendant cites a Washington case State v. Schmidt, 740 
P.2d 3 51, as a basis for not granting no-knock warrant, however, 
Schmidt appears to overstate the quantum and reliability of proof 
that should apply to taking of safety precautions when executing 
a search warrant, and appears to contradict the Utah view in 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah 1986). Therefore, it 
should not be considered persuasive. 
Defendant cites cases that seem to assert that persons 
suspected of drug dealing upon a probable cause finding retain 
the same search and seizure protections as do ordinary citizens. 
State v. Pierson, 472 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Neb. 1991); State v. 
Cleveland, 348 N.W.2d 512 n.6 (Wis. 1984). This is absurd. 
Citizens who are not suspected of crimes cannot be subjected to 
- 21 -
any unwanted police intrusions. Their rights cannot be compared 
to those of people whose "right to be let alone" has already been 
overcome by a judicial probable cause finding. See People v. 
Ouellette, 78 111.2d 511, 36 111. Dec. 666, 401 N.E.2d 507, 512 
(1979) (Underwood, J., dissenting). 
The cases cited by the defendant also implicitly presume 
that appellate judges, who do not conduct searches, are better 
able than law officers, who do conduct them, to decide the safer 
means of carrying out this activity. Again, the dissent in 
Ouellette is more persuasive: "Were I the officer obliged to 
search the occupied apartment of one possessing, and perhaps 
using, drugs, and reasonably believed to have a gun, I think I 
would prefer not to be warned of my arrival." 401 N.E.2d at 513 
(Underwood, J., dissenting). 
Finally, cases from other jurisdictions that strictly limit 
no-knock searches run contrary to Utah policy. In State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that citizens have no right to forcibly resist even an unlawful 
police search, and indeed are criminally liable if they do so. 
Id. at 572-576. Again, this search was lawful because of the 
underlying warrant. Consistent with Gardiner, the search cannot 
then become unlawful merely because officers anticipated that 
defendant might unlawfully resist it, and took reasonable 
measures to defeat or prevent such resistance. 
Where law enforcement officers, backed by a magistrate, 
determine that the risk of physical harm to persons outweighs 
problems of fright and property damage, as contemplated by 
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section 77-23-10(2), that determination should be affirmed on 
review, so long as some minimal, case-specific evidence supports 
it. Such evidence was present here. 
In sum, though the risks of evidence loss and physical 
danger in an announced search were not certain, they were 
sufficient to justify precautions. In proper deference to the 
officers, the magistrate, and the trial court, this Court should 
reaffirm the no-knock, nighttime authorization in this search 
warrant. 
III. IF THE MAGISTRATE'S NO-KNOCK AUTHORIZATION IS 
INVALIDATED ON APPEAL, SUPPRESSION OF THE 
EVIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED IN THIS CASE. 
As set forth in Point I of this brief, the City believes 
that the existence of probable cause to search defendant's home 
is unassailable. This is so even if this Court applies 
nondeferential review of the warrant affidavit, on the basis of 
the controlled cocaine buy in defendant's home. 
Accordingly, in response to defendant's argument that no 
"good faith exception" to the suppression of illegally seized 
evidence should apply under the Utah Constitution, the City 
chooses to address only the possibility that this Court may 
disagree with Point II of this brief, dealing with the no-knock 
search authorization. As follows, even if this Court decides 
that this no-knock authorization was improper, suppression of the 
seized evidence should not be required. 
A, Suppression of Evidence Seized During an 
Improper No-Knock Search is Not Necessarily 
Required in Every Case. 
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At the outset, it is not clear that violation of the no-
knock search statute, Utah Code Ann. section77-23-10 (1990) , 
compels suppression of evidence in any case. Although Rowe 
follows cases from other jurisdictions holding that suppression 
is required when a search runs afoul of a statute, 806 P.2d at 
738-39 (nighttime search), the issue is actually still open. 
Other courts have concluded that suppression is not always 
required where evidence is seized in violation of a no-knock 
statute. See State v. Ford, 801 P.2d 754, 764-66 (Or. 1990), and 
State v. Brock, 295 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543, 547 (1982)(suppression 
not required for violation of knock-and-announce or daytime 
search rules); People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 
380 N.E.2d 224 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 573, 100 
S.Ct. 1371(1980); Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d 
421, 423-24 (1985). See also United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 
1117, 1122,-24 (6th Cir. 1978)(nighttime search)(suppression not 
always required for violation of procedural rules), cert denied, 
440 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 1247 (1979). 
Further in State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Utah 
1987) , the Utah Supreme Court declined to suppress evidence 
obtained by an officer outside his geographic jurisdiction, but 
who did not act in an "outrageous" manner. Holding that 
suppression would be a disproportionate remedy, the Court stated 
that "[t]he officer/s conduct may warrant official sanctions, 
discipline, and/or civil and criminal liability." Id. at 1369. 
Later, in State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), the 
Court, faced with a no-knock search that had not been authorized 
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in the warrant, did not hold that suppression would necessarily 
be the remedy. The Court did not reach this question, because 
nobody had been home when the no-knock entry occurred, and 
therefore the special concerns underlying the knock-and-announce 
rule had not been implicated. 756 P.2d at 701-03. The Buck 
concurrence stated that even if the no-knock statute were 
deliberately violated, some "suitable remedy" would be fashioned. 
Id. at 703 (Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined by Durham, J.). 
This suggest that suppression—the normal remedy for a 
constitutional violation—may not be required when officers 
violate Utah's no-knock statute. 
It therefore seems sensible, instead of automatically 
suppressing evidence seized in an improper no-knock search, to 
consider an alternative remedy, such as ordering the offending 
officers or their department to pay for property damage caused by 
their entry. Such an alternative remedy seems especially 
appropriate where, as here, the underlying warrant is amply 
supported by probable cause. See Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. That 
warrant obliged the officers to seize the evidence in question; 
that obligation should not be undone merely because the seizure 
was effected by some problematic, but not outrageous, means. 
B. A "Reasonable Reliance" Exception to the 
Suppression of Evidence Seized Pursuant to a 
Defective Warrant Is Appropriate Under the 
Utah Constitution. 
In demanding suppression of the evidence, defendant also 
asks this Court, utilizing the Utah Constitution, to reject the 
so-called "good faith exception" to suppression of unlawfully 
seized evidence. This exception exists under the federal 
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constitution by virtue of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). Leon avoids suppression of evidence 
seized pursuant to a subsequently-invalidated search warrant, 
provided that officers conducting the search believed in good 
faith that the warrant was valid. 
Defendant has not argued that the magistrate here abandoned 
his neutral role, and has blatantly misrepresented the issue of 
truthfulness on the part of the affiant Gardiner. Nor does she 
argue that the officers could not have reasonably believed that 
the no-knock, nighttime authorization in this otherwise valid 
warrant was proper. Nevertheless, casting Leon as a threat to 
"fundamental principles," she argues that its reasonable reliance 
test should be rejected under the Utah Constitution. Utah 
appellate courts have not yet decided this question. See State 
v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah 1991), and State v. Rowe, 
806 P.2d 730, 740 (Utah App.)(Garff, J., concurring)(deferring 
the issue), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). 
C. Reversal of the No-Knock Authorization Would 
Require Overruling this Courts Precedent, 
Invalidation of this no-knock, nighttime authorization will 
require more than rejection of the City's arguments in Point II 
of this brief. This Court's own construction of the no-knock 
statute in Rowe will also have to be overruled, either by this 
Court or by the Utah Supreme Court, which has heard Rowe on 
certiorari, and now has it under advisement. 
The warrant affiant in Rowe had simply checked a preprinted 
no-knock request on the warrant affidavit, and stated that the 
sought-after contraband, narcotics in the residence, could be 
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easily destroyed, 806 P.2d at 732. The affiant did not allege a 
safety risk, another basis for a no-knock search under section 
77-23-10. Nevertheless, this Court affirmed the no-knock 
authorization upon the "sparse" affidavit, agreeing that "[t]he 
small amount of drugs ordinarily found in a residential setting 
can be easily and quickly destroyed with even the briefest 
notice." 806 P.2d at 733. 
Clearly this no-knock request was more complete than the 
one approved in Rowe. Affiant Gardiner, based on his experience, 
believed that the sought-after cocaine could be easily concealed 
or destroyed upon an announced search (affidavit at 5). His 
experience had also taught him that drug dealers are often armed, 
and this safety concern was buttressed by specific evidence of a 
criminal history. 
This affidavit therefore alleged both statutory bases for 
no-knock authority, and supported these allegations better than 
did Rowe in its affidavit. Accordingly, the Rowe standard for 
no-knock searches will have to be overruled before the no-knock 
authority in this case can be invalidated. 
D. Reliance on this Court's No-Knock Search 
Standard, Requires a Reasonable Reliance 
Exception to Suppression of Evidence. 
Even if the Rowe no-knock standard is overruled, this Court 
should hold that it was reasonably relied upon here. This 
warrant affidavit was submitted on March 5, 1991, one month after 
Rowe was issued. Thus Rowe's construction of the no-knock 
statute was fresh and controlling law. 
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Given that all parties involved can be charged with a 
knowledge of Rowe, if this Court determines that no-knock 
authority was improperly granted here, a "reasonable reliance" 
exception to suppression of the seized evidence is not merely 
permissible, but advisable. Suppression will not deter police 
misconduct: affiant Gardiner exceeded this Court's requirements 
for a no-knock request. Nor would suppression promote better 
affidavit scrutiny by prosecutors and magistrates: charged with 
upholding the law as authoritatively construed, they must 
necessarily rely on fresh appellate opinions as their guides. 
Rowe was just such an opinion here. 
Suppression of the evidence here would instead have 
undesirable results, not limited to defendant's evasion of 
criminal liability. Worse, suppression would essentially tell 
law enforcement officers that legal advice, magistrate authority, 
and contemporary case law are near-worthless guides to their 
conduct, and that warrants are not worth the trouble. Such a 
deeply cynical view should not be fostered. Indeed, such a view 
would erode freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, by 
discouraging the interposition of the judicial branch between law 
enforcement officers and citizens before searches occur. 
In the end, unless Rowe is both overruled and declared so 
outlandishly incorrect that no properly trained officer, 
prosecutor, or magistrate could rely upon it, suppression of the 
evidence seized in this no-knock search should not be ordered. 
Instead, the proper standard for no-knock authority should be 
spelled out, and prospectively applied. In the meantime, no-
• 9ft -
knock search warrants that comply with Rowe, such as this one, 
should not have their fruits suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
This search warrant was supported by probable cause, and 
the no-knock, nighttime authority granted in the warrant was in 
compliance with the law. Therefore, the trial court correctly 
denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized 
pursuant to the warrant. For these reasons, defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed. 
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